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VOLUME 34 SPRING 1959 NUMBER 1
ADVISORY OPINIONS-PRESENT STATUS AND
AN EVALUATION
GEORGE NEFF STEVENS*
As the term is used in the United States today, an advisory opinion'
is a formal opinion by a judge or judges of a supreme court,' or by a
* Dean, School of Law, University of Washington.
'The balance of this paper is in a sense an annotation in support of this proposed
definition.
BALLENTINE, LAW DiC-IONARY (1930) defines advisory opinion as: "The opinion
of a higher court upon a point before a lower one; an opinion rendered by a court, in
some jurisdictions, at the request of the legislature." WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1949) defines an advisory opinion as: "A formal opinion by a
judge or judges or a court or a law officer upon a question of law submitted by a legis-
lative body or a government official but not actually presented in a concrete case at law.
Such opinions have no binding force."
The Webster definition was quoted in Douglas Oil Co. v. State, 81 S.W.2d 1064,
at 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) which was reversed on other grounds. See also, BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1957). Interestingly, there is no definition of "advisory
opinion" in BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933) ; nor in WEBSTER, NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY (1933); nor in CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1940). The
advisory opinion has also been defined as "merely the opinion of a judge or judges
which adjudicates nothing and is binding on no one." State ex rel. Draper v. Wilder,
145 Ohio St 447, 62 N.E2d 156, at 160 (1945).
ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT, 1918, at p. 253,
"As generally understood, the advisory opinion is an opinion rendered by the highest
judicial officers in the state, acting as individuals and not in a judicial capacity, in
response to a request for information as to the state of the law or counsel as to the con-
stitutionality of proposed action, coming from the legislative or executive branches of
the government."
2 Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota.
ALABAMA-CODE OF ALA. (1940) title 13, §§ 34-36. Opinions on Constitutional
Questions.
Section 34. How opinion obtained.
The governor by a request in writing, or either house of the legislature, by a reso-
lution of such house, may obtain written opinion of the justices of the supreme
court of Alabama, or a majority thereof, on important constitutional questions.
(L. 1923, p. 25).
Section 35. Opinion is protective.
The opinion of the justices of the supreme court or a majority of them shall be
a protection to the officers and departments of the state, acting in accordance
therewith, in the same manner and to the same extent as opinions of the attorney
general of the state, and in the event of a conflict between the opinions of the
attorney general and the opinion of the justices of the supreme court rendered in
1
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supreme court,' in answer to a question of law,' submitted by a legisla-
tive body5 or a governor, a council, or a governor and council, of a state,6
which question is not related to nor concerned with a case or controversy
accordance with this article, the opinion of the justices of the supreme court shall
take precedence and prevail. All opinions of the justices of the supreme court
heretofore rendered in accordance with this article shall have the protective force
and effect provided for herein. (Ib.; 1927, p. 103).
Section 36. Briefs may be furnished supreme court.
The justices of the supreme court may request briefs from the attorney general,
and may receive briefs from other attorneys as amici curiae, as to such questions
as may be propounded to them for their answers. (L. 1923, p. 25).
DELAWARE-DEL. CODE ANN. title 10, S 141.
The Justices of the Supreme Court, whenever the Governor of this State shall
require it for public information, or to enable him to discharge the duties of his
office with fidelity, shall give him their opinions in writing touching the proper
construction of any provision in the Constitution of this State or the United
States, or the constitutionality of any law enacted by the Legislature of this State.
(Code 1935, § 374; C. 1915, § 402; C. 1852, § 482).
FLORIDA-FLoRIDA CoNsT. art. 4, § 13 (1885).
The Governor may, at any time, require the opinion of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, as to the interpretation of any portion of this Constitution upon any ques-
tion affecting his Executive powers and duties, and the Justices shall render such
opinion in writing. (Const. art. 5, § 16, 1868, as amended in 1875).
MAINE-MAINE CoNsT. art. VI, § 3 (1820).
[The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court] shall be obliged to give their opinion
upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, when required by
the governor, council, senate or house of representatives.
MASSACHUSETTS-MAsS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. III, art. II, § 83 (1780).
Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor and council, shall have
authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court,
upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.
NEW HAMPSHIRE-NEw HAMPSHIE CONST. pt 2, art. 74 (1784, as amended
in 1792).
Each branch of the legislature as well as the governor and council shall have
authority to require the opinions of the jsutices of the superior court upon im-
portant questions of law and upon solemn occasions.
OKLAHOMA-OxLAHossA STAT. ANN. title 22, §§ 1002 and 1003.
Section 1002. Governor to be informed of proceedings
The judge of a court at which a conviction requiring a judgment of death is had,
must, immediately after the conviction, transmit to the Governor, by mail or
otherwise, a statement of the conviction and judgment, and of the testimony given
at the trial. (R.L. 1910, § 5968.)
Section 1003. Governor may require opinion of appellate judges
The governor may thereupon require the opinion of the judges of the criminal
court of appeals, or any of them, upon the statement so furnished. (R.L. 1910,
§ 5969.) Note-Revision of 1910: Crim. Ct. of App. substituted for Sup. Ct.
RHODE ISLAND-RHODE ISLAND CONsT. amend, art. 12, § 2 (1903).
The judges of the supreme court shall give their written opinion upon any ques-
tion of law whenever requested by the governor or by either house of the general
assembly.
SOUTH DAKOTA-SOUTH DAKOTA CONST. art. V, § 13 (1889).
The governor shall have authority to require the opinions of the judges of the
supreme court upon important questions of law involved in the exercise of his
executive powers and upon solemn occasions.
NORTH CAROLINA-By case law. See Waddell v. Berry, 9 Ire. 361, 31 N.C. 518
(1848).
A word of credit for Ronald F. Mitchell, law student, who prepared the preliminary
report for me on "States Using the Advisory Opinion."
3 COLORADO-CoLo. Rav. STAT. 1953. CONSTITUTION art VI, § 3 (1876), as
amended Nov. 2, 1886.
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in actual litigation at the time,7 and which does not involve private
rights.8
At the present time, the advisory opinion procedure is used in eleven
states.9 In seven states it is provided for in and by the state constitu-
Section 3. Original jurisdiction-ophiion.-It shall have power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, injunction, and other original
and remedial writs, with authority to hear and determine the same; and each
judge of the supreme court shall have like power and authority as to writs of
habeas corpus. The supreme court shall give its opinion upon important ques-
tions upon solemn occasions when required by the governor, the senate, or the
house of representatives; and all such opinions shall be published in connection
with the reported decisions of said court.
4 All quotations are from constitutions or statutes listed in footnotes 2 and 3.
ALABAMA: "on important constitutional questions"; COLORADO: "upon im-
portant questions upon solemn occasions"; DELAWARE: "touching the proper con-
struction of any provision in the Constitution of this State or of the United States, or
the constutionality of any law enacted by the Legislature of this State"; FLORIDA:
"as to the interpretation of any portion of this Constitution upon any question affecting
his Executive powers and duties"; MAINE: "upon important questions of law, and
upon solemn occasion"; MASSACHUSETTS: "upon important questions of law,
and upon solemn occasions"; NEW HAMPSHIRE: "upon important questions of
law, and upon solemn occasions"; OKLAHOMA: "upon the statement" "of the con-
viction and judgment" "of death"; RHODE ISLAND: "upon any question of law";
SOUTH DAKOTA: "upon important questions of law involved in the exercise of
his executive powers and upon solemn occasions." NORTH CAROLINA: See Edsall,
The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C. L. REy. 297 (1949).
r For authority, see constitutions and statutes listed in footnotes 2 and 3. ALA-
BAMA: either house of the legislature; COLORADO: the senate or the house of
representatives; MAINE: the senate or house of representatives; MASSACHU-
SETTS: each branch of the legislature; NEW HAMPSHIRE: each branch of the
legislature; RHODE ISLAND: either house of the general assembly; NORTH
CAROLINA: either branch of the legislature; for authority, see Edsall, The Advisory
Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C.L.REv. 297 (1949).
0 For authority, see constitutions and statutes listed in footnotes 2 and 3. ALA-
BAMA: the governor; COLORADO: the governor; DELAWARE: the governor;
FLORIDA: the governor; MAINE: the governor, and the council; MASSACHU-
SETTS: the governor and council, which has been interpreted to mean that the gov-
ernor alone cannot request an opinion, see In re opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 602
at 605, 102 N.E. 644 (1913) ; NEW HAMPSHIRE: the governor and council, which
has been interpreted to mean that the request must come from both, see Opinion of
Justices, 74 N.H. 606, 68 Atl. 873 (1907) ; OKLAHOMA: the governor; RHODE
ISLAND: the governor; SOUTH DAKOTA: the governor; NORTH CARO-
LINA: the governor, see Edsall, 27 N.C.L.REv. 297 (1949).
7 This requirement is implicit in any definition of advisory opinions. See In re Inter-
rogatories, 112 Colo. 294, 148 P.2d 809 (1944) ; State v. Cleveland, 58 Me. 564, 573
(1870) ; Johnson v. State, 82 Okla. Crin. 437, 172 P2d 337 (1946).
8 In re Opinions of the Justices, 209 Ala. 593, 96 So. 487 (1923) ; In re Senate Bill
65, 12 Colo. 466, 21 Pac. 478 (1889) ; In re Interrogatories propounded by the Senate
Concerning House Bill 456, 131 Colo. 389, 281 P.2d 1013 (1955) ; Opinion of Justices, 95
N.H. 557, 66 A.2d 76 (1949) ; Opinions of the Justices, 64 N.C. 785 (1870).
9 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. For authority, see foot-
notes 2 and 3. See also:
Book:
Ellingvood, Albert R. Departmental Cooperation in State Government. George
Banta Publishing Co., Menasha, Wisc. 1918. 300 p.
Articles:
Dubuque, The Duty of Judges as Constitutional Advisors, 24 Am. L. Rav. 369-398
(1890), HAv. L Rav. 50 (1896).
Emery, Advisory Opinions from Justices, 2 ML. L. Ray. 1 (1908).
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tion, 0 in two states by general statutes," in one state by statute in a
very limited area, 2 and in one state by judicial custom."
No state has provided for advisory opinions by its constitution since
1890, and the most recent successful attempt to provide for advisory
opinions by statute was in 1923.'"
Of the eleven states employing advisory opinions, in nine the governor
alone may request advisory opinions," in two the governor and council
may,' 6 in one the council alone may," and in seven either branch of
the legislature may.'
The kind of question which may be asked in any one of the eleven
states using the advisory opinion procedure depends upon the consti-
tutional or statutory authorization in ten states and upon the willingness
of the court in the eleventh.'" The scope of these provisions, which are
set forth in full in footnotes 2 and 3, vary considerably. Yet the annota-
Emery, Advisory Opinions of the Justices, 11 ME. L. Ray. 15 (1917).
Grinnell, The History of the Duty of the Court to Render Advisory Opinions, 2
MASs. L. Q. 542 (1917).
Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002 (1924).
Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37 HARv. L. REV.
970 (1924).
Clovis and Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13 IowA L. Ray. 188 (1928).
Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 OHIo ST. L. J. 21 (1937).
Davidson, The Constitutionality and Utility of Advisory Opinions, 2 U. TORONTO
L. J. 254 (1938).
Goodrich, The Nature of the Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, 32 Am. J. INT'L LAW. 738 (1938).
Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N. C. L. Ray. 297-343 (1949).
Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND. L. J. 203-230 (1949).
Sands, Government by Judiciary-Advisory Opinions in Alabama, 4 ALA. L. Ray.
1-43 (1951).
Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 1302-1313
(1951).
Hoffman, Why Not Advisory Opinions for Illinois, 31 CHL-KENT L. Ry. 141-150(1952).
' Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and
South Dakota. For constitutional authority, see footnotes 2 and 3.
"1 Alabama and Delaware. For statutory authority see footnote 2. For judicial ap-
proval, see, In re Opinions of the Justices, 209 Ala. 593, 96 So. 487 (1923) and In re
Opinions of the Justices, 47 Del. 117, 88 A.2d 128 (1952).
12 Oklahoma: Upon the statement of a conviction requiring a judgment of death.
For statutory authority, see footnote 2. For judicial approval, see Opinion of the
Judges, 3 Okla. Crim. 315, 105 Pac. 684 (1909).
"3 North Carolina: Waddell v. Berry, 9 Ire. 361, 31 N.C. 518 (1848) ; and see Edsall,
footnote 9.
14 South Dakota, by constitution, in 1889 and Alabama, by statute, in 1923, which
statute was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court the same year. See footnote 11.
For dates of earlier constitutions and statutes, see footnotes 2 and 3.
135 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maine, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Dakota. See footnote 6.
16 Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See footnote 6.
17 Maine. Opinion of the Justices, 72 Me. 542 (1881). And see footnote 2.
is Alabama, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina and
Rhode Island. See footnote 5.
19 North Carolina. See footnote 13.
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tions to these provisions make it abundantly clear that in every state
a rule of strict construction is employed."
For example, the courts have said that they will not answer questions
requiring the determination of a question of fact,2' nor will they answer
questions bearing upon wisdom and expediency, as distinguished from
power and authority.22 They have refused to give opinions upon mat-
ters likely to come before the court for decision. They have con-
sitently refused to answer questions which involved private rights.2
And, they have held that it is for the court to determine whether the
question comes within the constitutional or statutory language, such as
"solemn occasion, 2  or "important questions of law."28
The actual subject matter of the questions upon which advisory
opinions have been given covers a wide variety of topics. Ellingwood's
classification of the "Nature of Questions" and a later study by Oliver
P. Field will serve as excellent examples for those who are interested.
0 In re Senate Bill, 45 Colo. 394, 101 Pac. 410 (1909) ; It re Opinion of the Justices,
47 Del. 117, 88 A.2d 128 (1952) ; It re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 103 Fla. 668,
137 So. 881 (1931) ; Opinion of the Justices, 147 Me. 410, 105 A.2d 454 (1952) ; It re
Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 602, 102 N.E. 644 (1913) ; Opinion of the Justices,
99 N.H. 524, 113 A.2d 542 (1955) ; Certain Members of the Senate in the General As-
sembly, 58 R.I. 142, 191 Atl. 518 (1937) ; It re Construction of Constitution, 3 S.D.
548, 54 N.W. 650 (1893). The writers in this field, whether favorable or opposed to
advisory opinions, have all noted this tendency of the courts to limit the use of the
advisory opinion, even under a constitutional grant of power. See footnote 9 for list of
authors and citations.
"I See, for example, People ex reL. Engly v. Martin, 19 Colo. 565, 36 Pac. 543
(1894) ; Dinan v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516, 112 N.E. 91 (1916) ; Opinion of Justices, 45
N.H. 607 (1864) ; In re Construction of Constitution, 3 S.D. 548, 54 N.W. 650 at 652
(1893).
22 Opinion of the Justices, 95 Me. 564, 51 Atl. 224 (1901) ; Opinion of the Justices,
314 Mass. 767, 49 N.E.2d 252 (1943) ; In re Construction of Constitution, 3 S.D. 548,
54 N.V. 650 at 652 (1893).
2 In re Interrogatories of Governor, 126 Colo. 48, 245 P.2d 1173 (1952) ; Petition
of Turner, 97 N.H. 449, 91 A.2d 458 (1952).
'4 See footnote 8.
20 In re Senate Resolution No. 2, 94 Colo. 101, 31 P.2d 325 (1933) ; Opinion of
Justices, 95 Me. 564, 51 Atl. 224 (1901) ; Opinion of the Justices, 330 Mass. 713, 113
N.E.2d 452 (1953) ; In re Opinion of Judges, 34 S.D. 650, 147 N.W. 729 (1914).
6 Opinion of the Justices, 253 Ala. 111, 43 So.2d 3 (1949) ; Opinion of the Justices,
254 Ala. 177, 47 So.2d 655 (1950) ; Opinion of the Justices, 147 Me. 410, 105 A.2d 454
(1952).
27 Ellingwood, (1918), footnote 9, Chap. 2, the Advisory Opinion in Practice, B.
Nature of Questions, pp. 99-146 (1918). His classification of subjects is as follows:
1. The Legislative Department: (a) Composition of the legislature; (b) Or-
ganization and Procedure; (c) Financial Powers and Duties of the Legislature,
incl. Ta:ation, Appropriations and Miscellaneous; (d) Police Power of the
Legislature; (e) Eminent Domain; (f) Education; (g) Labor; (h) Miscella-
neous Questions as to Legislative Power.
2. The Executive Department: (a) Composition and Organization; (b) Finan-
cial Administration; (c) Appointment and Removal Powers of Executive Offi-
cers; (d) Electoral Duties; (e) Military Questions; (f) The Execution of the
Criminal Law; (g) Miscellaneous.
3. The Judiciary, most of them dealing with tenure of justices.
4. Suffrage and Elections.
5. Miscellaneous, such as amendments to state constitution.
1959]
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The actual coverage in any one of the eleven states using the advisory
opinion is of course limited by the constitutional or statutory provision
and by the policy of strict interpretation above referred to.
There is authority in each of the eleven states using the advisory
opinion procedure to the effect that such opinions are advisory only,
result in no judgment or decree, and bind no one. "8 If this be taken lit-
erally one wonders why an advisory opinion is either sought or given.
Legally, the statement is, as indicated, amply supported by authority.
However, as a practical matter, not only the courts," but also the
Field, supra note 9, at 210: (1) taxation and governmental finance, (2) govern-
mental structure, (3) regulation of business, (4) voting and elections, (5) police power
regulations, (6) highways, (7) local government and schools, (8) legislative pro-
cedure and statutory construction, (9) social security and compensation payments,(10) Property rights and interests--eminent domain.28
I, re Opinions of the Justices, 209 Ala. 593, 96 So. 487 (1923) ; People ex rel.
Engly v. Martin, 19 Colo. 565, 36 Pac. 543 (1894) ; In re Opinions of the Justices, 47
Del. 117, 88 A.2d 128 (1952) ; Lee v. Dowda, 155 Fla. 68, 19 So.2d 570 (1944) ; State
v. Cleveland, 58 Me. 564, at 573 (1870) ; City of Boston v. Treasurer and Receiver
General, 237 Mass. 403, 130 N.E. 390 (1921), Opinion of Justices, 25 N.H. 537 (1852) ;
State v. Rogland, 75 N.C. 11 (1876) ; Opinion of the Judges, 3 Okla. Crim. 315, 105
Pac. 684 (1909) ; In re Opinion of the Justices, 51 R.I. 322, 154 Atl. 647 (1931) ; In re
Opinion of Judges, 34 S.D. 650, 147 N.W. 729 (1914).
29 See, for example: In re Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 177, 47 So.2d 655 at
656 (1950). (".... Such opinions ... bind neither the justices nor the department or
officer requesting the opinion. They are merely advisory-consultative only .... yet it
is to be observed from Sec. 5 of the statute that one of its main functions was that the
opinions of the justices should give protective force and effect to officers and depart-
ments of the state in acting under existing law.") ; State ex rel. Satterthwaite v. High-
field, 4 W. W. Harr. 272, 34 Del. 272, 152 Atl. 45 at 48 (1930) (.... This opinion,
not being the opinion of a Court in a case pending before it, is not binding on us, but
we hold such a high regard for the learning and legal ability of the Judges then sitting
that their opinion would be very persuasive and almost controlling in an ordinary
case.") ; Lee v. Dowda, 155 Fla. 68, 19 So.2d 570 at 572 (1944). ("While advisory
opinions to the Governor are not binding judicial precedents, they are frequently very
persuasive and usually adhered to.") ; State cx rel. Williams v. Lee, 121 Fla. 815, 164
So. 536 at 538 (1935) ("While advisory opinions do not necessarily control in liti-
gated cases, they have a persuasive value, and we think the rule as stated in that
opinion is applicable ... and disposes of the.., motion") ; Opinion of the Justices,
70 Me. 570 at 583 (1880) (".... [T]he governor, by virtue of his constitutional pre-
rogative, called upon this court for its opinion upon the questions propounded .... It
gave full answers to those questions .... The law thus determined is the conclusive
guide of the governor and council in the performance of their ministerial duties ...") ;
Fellows cx rel. Cummings v. Eastman, 126 Me. 147, 136 Atl. 810 at 812 (1927) ("In
removing the relator, the Governor proceeded in accordance with the judicial inter-
pretation of the amendment obtained by him under the Constitution. While the legality
of relator's removal from the office may not be thereby rendered res adjudicata, nor
does the rule of stare decisis apply to the constitutional advisory opinions of the
Justices where property rights are concerned, but where property rights are not in-
volved, a public office being a public trust and not a vested property right [citing
cases], and the advice being given to guide the Governor in the performance of a
public and constitutional function of government, and having been followed, public
policy, at least, requires that strong and compelling reasons be presented before the
court sitting en banc will hold an act by the Chief Executive of this nature invalid
when taken in pursuance of a construction of the organic law given upon request under
the Constitution by a majority of the court.. .") ; In re Opinion to the Governor re
Constitutional Convention, 55 R.I. 56, 178 Ati. 433 (1935) ("Yet the judges of this
court in 1883 in their opinion entitled In re the Constitutional Convention [14 R.I. 649
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writers,"' recognize that advisory opinions carry real weight. They are
almost invariably accepted by those who requested the opinion and
are cited quite frequently in later cases both at home and in other juris-
dictions as authority.31
There is evidence that the advisory opinion practice was once em-
ployed in eight states no longer using it.3" It was abolished by consti-
tutional amendment in one state,33 probably because of the hostility of
the judges.34 It was rejected by rule of court in another state," prob-
ably as a consequence of a vigorous dissent by one of the judges."0
Apparently, it lapsed through disuse in one state.37 And the practice
was stopped by judicial decision in the remaining five."
(1883)] advised the Senate that [a constitutional convention could not be called
legally]".
"We do not feel bound to follow that opinion. While it is entitled to respect, and
we have given it careful attention, it is not a decision of this court, and therefore can
have no weight as a precedent.") Interestingly, the stultifying effect of the earlier
advisory opinion was the source of Professor, now Mr. Justice, Frankfurter's famous
remark-"It must be remembered that advisory opinions are not merely advisory
opinions. They are ghosts that slay." 37 HARV. L. REv. 1002 at 1008 (1924).
O See, Ellingwood, footnote 9, pp. 154-159, 234-237; Edsall, footnote 9, pp. 330-331;
Frankfurter, footnote 9, at 1008; Field, footnote 9, pp. 213-214, 216; Clovis and Upde-
graff, footnote 9, pp. 192-193, 195. Hudson, footnote 9, apparently felt that they were
not given enough recognition, at p. 982-983, where he concludes, "Stare decisis is inap-
plicable, but short of that there is room for giving advisory opinions great weight."
31 Field, footnote 9, at p. 216 "Advisory opinions are used as precedents by the bar,
by the courts, and by the public. They are ctied in briefs, in opinions by the courts,
and despite the fact that they are sometimes carefully distinguished from judicial deci-
sions, they are relied on as fully as decisions are, so far as precedent is concerned. For
instance, Massachusetts advisory opinions to the legislature have each been cited on an
average of fourteen times by the courts. According to Shepard's Citator, the advisory
opinions from the five states here studied [Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and South Dakota] have been cited on an average of six times each." See
also, book and articles listed in footnote 9.
92 Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, and Vermont.
33 Missouri. The clause authorizing advisory opinions which appeared in the 1865
Constitution was omitted from the Constitution of 1875.
94 This is Mr. Ellingwood's opinion, and it seems well taken. See Ellingwood, foot-
note 9, History of the Advisory Opinion, (e) Missouri, pp. 43-46.
35 Nebraska. 37 Neb. XIII, Rule 23, Jan. 4, 1894.36 This, again, is Mr. Elling-wood's opinion, and, again, it seems well taken. See
Ellingwood, footnote 9, (1) Nebraska, pp. 74-76. See also, Justice Noval's dissent in
In re Board of Public Lands and Buildings, 37 Neb. 425, 55 N.W. 1092 at 1094 (1893).
t7 The Judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made a report to the legisla-
ture on the English statutes in force in the Commonwealth, which is reported in 3
Binney 593 (Pa. 1808). There is no evidence of any other advisory opinions in Penn-
sylvania thereafter.
3s CONNECTICUT: Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. 586 (1867), where the Judges
of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, after having given advice on two previ-
ous occasions, declined to do so further; KENTUCKY: In re Constitutionality of
House Bill No. 222, 262 Ky. 437, 90 S.W.2d 692 (1936). The Kentucky court had
rendered an advisory opinion in Opinion of Judges of Court of Appeals, 79 Ky. 621
(1881); NEW JERSEY: Hester v. Miller, 8 N.J. 81, 83 A.2d 773 (1951). For an
early case in which an advisory opinion was given under a statute giving the court
power to issue advisory opinions as to whether a statute was properly enacted see In re
an Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act Concerning Public Utilities," 83 N. J. L.
303, 84 Atl. 706 (1912) ; NEW YORK: Matter of State Industrial Commission, 224
19591 ADVISORY OPINIONS
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The reasons given by these five courts in rejecting the advisory
opinion practice are interesting and significant:
1) The practice is extra-judicial-no parties before the court and
therefore nothing to adjudicate."
2) Such opinions are merely advisory, "except perhaps as we our-
selves, if sitting upon an actual case might be inclined to adhere to an
opinion which we had expressed," formed ex parte, and without
assistance of counsel. 40
3) Conflicts with judicial duties--danger of pre-judgment of ques-
tions likely to come before the court.4 '
4) It interferes with the separate and independent rights and duties
of the legislature."
5) Under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is not a judicial
function; so the legislature is without power to charge the court with
non-judicial functions.4
6) A supreme court, by constitution, has appellate jurisdiction only,
and rendering an advisory opinion is not a "review."' 4
7) "This we will not do."4
Requests for advisory opinions have been refused from the outset by
the Supreme Court of the United States," and by the supreme courts of
ten states.4 ' The reasons given by the Supreme Court of the United
N.Y. 13, 119 N.E. 1027 (1913). For the early history of advisory opinions in New
York see Ellingwood, footnote 9, at pp. 65-68; VERMONT: In re Opinion of the
Justices, 115 Vt. 524, 64 A.2d 169 (1949), in which the court pointed out that although
it had given advisory opinions in the past, it had no such power under the constitution,
nor could the legislature confer any such power on the court. Vermont had had a
statute authorizing advisory opinions, enacted in 1864 and repealed in 1915.
39 Connecticut and Kentucky. See footnote 38.
40 Connecticut, footnote 38. Compare, footnote 29.
41 Connecticut, footnote 38.
42 Connecticut, footnote 38.
43Kentucky, New York and Vermont. See footnote 38.
44 Kentucky, footnote 38.
45 New Jersey, footnote 38.
46 For a history of the advisory opinion in the Supreme Court see Ellingwood, foot-
note 9, at pp. 55-64; the footnote to Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, at 410-414 (1792) ;
and, Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, at
113 (1948), in which the Supreme Court said: "This Court early and wisely deter-
mined that it would not give advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Execu-
tive."
47 LOUISIANA: State ex rel. Day v. Rapides Parish School Board, 158 La. 251,
103 So. 757 (1925) ; MARYLAND: The Maryland-National Capital Park and Plan-
ning Comm'n v. Randall, 209 Md. 18, 120 A.2d 195 (1956); MICHIGAN: Connor v.
Herrick, 349 Mich. 201, 84 N.W.2d 427 (1957) ; MINNESOTA: Re Senate of State,
10 Minn. 78, 10 Gil. 56 (1865) ; Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. 103, 19 Gil. 74 (1872);
MISSISSIPPI: In re Opinion of the Justices, 148 Miss. 427, 114 So. 887 (1928)
NORTH DAKOTA: Langer v. North Dakota, 69 N.D. 129, 284 N.W. 238 at 250-252(1939); OHIO: State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455 (1882); TEXAS: Morrow v.
Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641 at 646 (1933); TENNESSEE: DeSaussure v.
Hall, 297 S.W.2d 90 (1956); WISCONSIN: State ex rel. La Follette v. Dammann,
220 Wis. 17, 264 N.W. 627 (1936).
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States for declining to give advisory opinions are these: The judges
deemed it improper to enter the field of politics by declaring their
opinions on questions not growing out of cases before them;4" the juris-
ditcion of the Supreme Court of the United States "is limited to cases
and controversies in such form that judicial power is capable of acting
on them";" and the doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the
executive or legislative branches from imposing any but judicial duties
upon the courts. 0
In the ten states where the judges have refused to give advisory opin-
ions, the underlying reason was, and is, their belief that, since the giving
of such opinions is not the exercise of a judicial function, the practice
is, in the absence of specific constitutional authorization, a violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers."' The judges from these ten states-
added these comments:
-1 See footnote 46.
40 Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 at 444 (1923). The opinion,
following the material quoted in the text continues, ".... and does not extend to an
issue of constitutional law framed by Congress for the purpose of invoking the advice
of this court without real parties or a real case, or to administrative or legislative
issues or controversies. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 410, note: ...".
60 Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 at 700 (1864). ". . . Its jurisdiction and
powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all
strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other
jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty...."
r' LOUISIANA, footnote 47, at 760 of 103 So.-"In some states the court of last
resort renders advisory opinions at the request of other departments of the govern-
ment, but not in this state."; MARYLAND, footnote 47, at 199 of 120 A.2d-"It has
been held specifically by this Court that it will not render advisory opinions to the
Legislature or to anyone else."; MICHIGAN, footnote 47, at 439 of 84 N.W.2d-
"The case currently pending before us in its present form represents in essence an
attempt to secure an advisory opinion as to the validity of a bond issue from a Supreme
Court not constitutionally authorized to issue same. . . ."; MINNEOSTA, footnote
47, at 57 of 10 Gil. -- "... By the constitution, the power of the state government is
divided into three distinct departments, legislative, executive and judicial. The powers
and duties of each department are distinctly defined. The departments are independent
of each other to the extent, at least, that neither can exercise any of the powers of the
others not expressly provided for... This not only prevents an assumption by
either department of power not properly belonging to it, but also prohibits the imposi-
tion, by one, of any duty upon either of the others not within the scope of its juris-
diction; ... Any departure from these important principles must be attended with
evil.. . .", and at p. 58, "The duty sought to be imposed by the section of the act
referred to, is, clearly, neither a judicial act, nor is it to be performed in a judicial
manner."; MISSISSIPPI, footnote 47, at 888 of 114 So.--"Section 1 of the Consti-
tution, which divides the powers of government into three departments, impliedly pro-
hibits the giving of advisory opinions by one department to another, except in so far
as another section of the Constitution may provide therefor."; NORTH DAKOTA,
footnote 47, at 252 of 284 N.W.-"The debates of the Constitutional Convention leave
no doubt that it was the deliberate judgment of the framers of the State Constitution
that Judges of the Supreme Court, as part of their official duties, should not be re-
quired, or authorized, to give advisory opinions."; OHIO, footnote 47, 38 Ohio (St.)
455, at 459-"The division of the powers of the state into legislative, executive andjudicial, and the confiding of these powers to distinct departments, is fundamental ....
even though the decision 'would be of great value to the general assembly' in the dis-
charge of its duties, it would, nevertheless, be an unwarranted interference with the
function of the legislative department that would be unauthorized, and dangerous in
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Generally failure has met attempts by legislation or litigation to
employ the courts for legal advice rather than for decision of justiciable
controversies between adverse parties. 2
The impropriety of an unauthorized expression of opinion by a judge
or court, especially one of last resort, upon a matter which may subse-
quently come before the court for adjudication, will immediately
suggest itself."5
The Attorney General is the officer to advise the civil officers, and
when questions come before the Supreme Court, that court is then
untrammeled.
54
[I]t would be an attempt to settle questions of law involving the
rights of persons without parties before it, or a case to be decided in
due course of law, thus violating that provision of the Bill of Rights
which declares that every person shall have a remedy for an injury
done him by due course of law.55
In several instances, judges of courts in this group questioned the
wisdom of the practice, while conceding its legality, even in those states
where authority came from the state constitution.""
There is of course no problem with the doctrine of separation of
powers in the seven states operating under constitutional provisions."
tendency."; TEXAS, footnote 47, at 646 of 62 S.W.2d--"Neither [court] is given any
advisory power by the organic law and since not given, . . . it is denied and can not
be given by the Legislature"; TENNESSEE, footnote 47, at 91 of 297 S.W.2d-
".... any opinion that we might express would be an advisory opinion which we are
not authorized to give."; and WISCONSIN, footnote 46, at 629 of 264 N.W.-"In the
absence of constitutional provisions so requiring, courts will not render merely advisory
opinions, even though such opinions be requested by coordinate branches of the gov-
ernment." See also, decisions in Conmecticut, Kentucky, New York and Vermont,
footnote 38.
Z2 Michigan, footnote 47, at 440 of 84 N.W.2d.
53 MINNESOTA, footnote 47, at 58 of 10 Gil; MISSISSIPPI, footnote 47, at 888
of 114 So.--"Moreover, and aside from this prohibition, the giving by judges of
opinions on questions that may thereafter be submitted for decision to the courts of
which they are members is highly improper unless they are constitutionally authorized
so to do."
54 North Dakota, footnote 47, at 251 of 284 N.W. And see, Emery, footnote 9,
2 ME. L. REV. 1 at 5-"The writer sees no reason why either branch of the Maine legis-
lature may not obtain, when necessary, good legal opinions from its own law com-
mittees, as well as from the Attorney General. Those committees have this great
advantage over the justices, they can give hearings to all interested persons."
55 Ohio, footnote 47, at 459 of 38 Ohio St.
56 NORTH DAKOTA, footnote 47, at 251 of 284 N.W.--". .. 'I grant it may be
found in a very few, and I think I can safely say that there is not a state in the Union
where that provision prevails but not only the Supreme Court but every other person
who has an intimate knowledge of the workings of that provision would wish it were
not there.' Debates Constitutional Convention, North Dakota, pp. 230, 231"; MIN-
NESOTA, footnote 47, at 58 of 10 Gil.-". .. of course in such cases [advisory
opinions authorized by constitution] official responsibility attaches to the discharge of
the duty, and thus one serious objection is removed. Although we confess that, for
other reasons, such a constitutional provision does not address itself to our minds
with any favor."
57 Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
South Dakota. See footnotes 2 and 3 for constitutional provisions. But see Emery,
2 ME. L. Ray. 1 (1908)-"The provision is at variance with what is generally regarded
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Yet, one cannot read the cases set forth in the annotations to these pro-
visions without sensing opposition to the practice. It comes out quite
clearly in the policy of strict interpretation, referred to earlier in this
article, resulting in a limitation on the authority of the judges to render
advisory opinions -- a policy which, by the way, produces restrictive
opinions which appear to be readily accepted by the judges as binding
on them!
The inherent danger in an advisory opinion, even though given under
constitutional authority by judges as individuals and all too frequently
without the benefit of argument, has been recognized. Thus, the
judges have been admonished to make every effort to guard against
any influence flowing from an earlier opinion when the question therein
considered comes before them in the course of litigation. 9 Or, as
one court put it:
It may not be improper for us to further suggest that a satisfactory
response to the resolution would require vast research, and extraordi-
nary caution. Whenever we assume the right to answer such questions,
we must act, both as court and counsel, upon ex parte proceedings. It
is a principle declared by our constitution, (section 2, art. 6) and of
universal recognition, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. There can be no due process
of law unless the party to be affected has his day in court. Yet a hasty
construction and application of this provision might lead to the ex parte
adjudication of private rights by means of an executive question, with-
out giving the party interested a day or voice in court.60
In another opinion in justification of a restrictive interpretation, it
was pointed out that any other position would "impose upon the court
a burden it would be impossible to carry." "' This same opinion went
on to suggest that if advisory opinions were given too freely it would
give the court "an influence upon prospective legislative action not
contemplated by the Constitution." 62 And, finally, a court with ad-
visory opinions responsibility said:
as a fundamental principle in a constitutional republic and one strongly emphasized in
the Maine constitution, viz.-the independence of the judiciary, the complete separation
of the judicial power and functions from both the legislative and executive."58 See, for example, the cases cited in footnotes 7, 8, and 20-26.
59 See, for example, City of Boston v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 237 Mass.
403, 130 N.E. 390 at 391 (1921) ; and Building Inspector of Lowell v. Stoklosa, 250
Mass. 52, 145 N.E. 262 at 263 (1924)---"Such opinions... are given without thebenefit of argument, are liable to error.... When called upon to decide the same
question coming before them as a court, the justices guard themselves most sedulously
against any influences flowing from their previous consideration."60 In re Construction of Constitution, 3 S.D. 548, 54 N.W. 650 at 652 (1893).61 In re Interrogatories by the Governor, 71 Colo. 331, 206 Pac. 383 (1922).
62 See footnote 61; and see Sands, footnote 9, at pp. 35-38.
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As a general proposition we seriously doubt the wisdom of prejudg-
ing involved legal problems and fundamental constitutional interpreta-
tions in ex parte proceedings of this nature, and it has been, and is, the
policy of our Court to accommodate the legislature only in such cases
as are clear and wherein no possible prejudice to anyone may later
result. 3
As noted, the judges of the supreme courts of four states give ad-
visory opinions without the benefit of a constitutional provision."4 In
two of these states, operating under statutory authority, the judges are
of the opinion that under their respective constitutions the legislatures
have the power to assign non-judicial functions to the judges by statute
and that, therefore, the doctrine of separation of powers is not appli-
cable." In a third state, operating under statutory authority, the judges
refused to consider the question of constitutionality, on the ground that
the opinion was advisory only.6
Interestingly, a recent opinion in one of these states reminded the
legislature that the individual justices were privileged, but not required,
under statute, to give advisory opinions. It was also said:
You must know the vast volume of work under which the court is
laboring from cases properly submitted to it for review from inferior
tribunals, and we do not think... that these labors be distracted by the
individual justices departing from the duties of their office to take the
time necessary in studying the law to give answers to such hypothetical
questions.
The court further informed the legislature that "the court . . . is one
of appellate review and the constitutionality of statutes should be tested
by appropriate adversary proceedings when available or when at all
possible." '
In one state, where the advisory opinion practice stems from judicial
willingness alone, the doctrine of separation of powers has given the
6 3
n re Interrogatories propounded by the Senate concerning House Bill 456, 131
Colo. 389, 281 P.2d 1013 at 1016 (1955).
64 Alabama, Delaware and Oklahoma under statute, and North Carolina by court
decision. See footnote 2.6 5 In re Opinions of the Justices, 209 Alabama 593, 96 So. 487 (1923) ; In re Opinions
of the Justices, 47 Del. 117, 88 A.2d 128 (1952), wherein at p. 139 of 88 A.2d, the
justices said: ".... It may be observed, however, that the dangers to popular govern-
ment to be apprehended from an intermingling of the functions of the three depart-
ments seems to be of least gravity in the case of the performance of minor executive
or administrative duties by members of the judiciary-traditionally the weakest of the
three departments of government." The justices pointed out that no question of con-
stitutionality of the advisory opinion statute was suggested at the time they gave their
opinions in In re School Code of 1919, 7 Boyce 406, 30 Del. 406, 108 Atl. 40 (1919).
61 Opinion of the Judges, 3 Okla. Crim. 315, 105 Pac. 684 (1909).
17 ln re Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 177, 47 So. 2d 655 at 656-657 (1950). See,
Sands, footnote 9, especially his conclusions at pp. 31-33.
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judges some concern. Apparently, the point was not raised, or, if so,
not discussed in the opinion which established the practice."8 It has
been raised on several occasions since then, but a majority of the
judges have gone along with the practice. 8
CONCLUSIONS
The principal objective" of the advisory opinion practice is to provide
a speedy and inexpensive means of passing upon the constitutionality
of proposed legislation or proposed executive action in order to reduce
the possibility of enacting unconstitutional statutes or taking unconsti-
tutional action. It is contended that the practice would save the tax-
payers and the public the expense of prolonged litigation and prevent
the disruptions arising out of reliance by the public on unconstitutional
statutes and actions.7'
The principal objections to the practice are procedural and philosoph-
ical. The procedural objections go to the lack of adequate argument,
oral and written; burden on the judges, since they must do their own
research in most instances; insufficient time to give the matter proper
consideraton, because the legislative body or executive officer wants
an answer immediately; and the difficulties encountered in interpreta-
tion, because questions are presented in the abstract, rather than with
reference to particular facts. The principal philosophical objection
stems from the doctrine of separation of powers. The advisory opinion
practice does place in the judges a degree of control over legislative and
executive conduct, duties, and obligations above and beyond the ju-
dicial function which can and does have serious implications on the
operation of government under the doctrine of separation of powers. 2
0s Waddell v. Berry, 9 Ire. 361, 31 N.C. 518 (1848), wherein it is stated, "Although
not strictly an act of official obligation, which could not be declined, yet from the
nature of the questions and purposes to which the answers are to be applied-being
somewhat of a judicial character-the Judges have deemed it a duty of courtesy and
respect to the Senate to consider the points submitted to them and to give their opinions
thereon."
0o See, Edsall, footnote 9.
70 For detailed discussion of objectives and objections see book and articles cited in
footnote 9.
71 See, in particular, Ellingfwood, chap. V, The Place of the Adzisorlv Opinion, pp.
248-257; Clovis and Updegraff; and Field; cited in footnote 9.
% Frankfurter, footnote 9, at p. 1007--"Perhaps the most costly price of advisory
opinions is the weakening of legislative and popular responsibility."; Aumann, footnote
9, at p. 52--"If the holders of legislative power are careless, or ineffective, the courts
cannot improve the matter by attempting a function not their own."; Field, footnote 9,
at p. 213----"The advisory opinion restricts the legislature more than the regular opera-
tion of judicial review does.... fore proposed legislation is declared invalid, than
courts find invalid in litigated cases."; Sands, footnote 9, at p. 38-"If advisory opinions
were not available, then legislative and executive officials would be forced to face up
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The advisory opinion practice as it has developed in this country
serves a very limited area. Furthermore, even in this limited area, it
has not been used extensively." Its disadvantages far outweigh its
actual and potential advantages, for the steps necessary to cure the
defects would wipe out most, if not all, the few advantages which the
practice now offers-principally, speedy determination. Procedural
reform, looking to a speedier determination of litigated cases, and a
wider use of the prerogatve writs and the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure will accomplish far more, in a sounder manner, than could be
obtained under any extension of the advisory opinion practice.
to constitutional questions and take responsibility for the initial decisions on those ques-
tions . . . they can dodge responsibility by passing the buck to the justices.... [T]he
device thus enables governmental action to be blocked effectively by ex parte interpre-
tations of the constitution by a majority of that small group of government officials
which is the least subject, of all officialdom, to democratic political controls. This
amounts, in short, to too much gvernment by judiciary."
73 See Field, footnote 9: Advisory opinions-number of
Field lists cases Between Annotations show Between
Colorado 105 1886-1937 9 more 1937-1957
Maine 75 1820-1937 17 more 1937-1957
Massachusetts 152 1780-1937 12 more 1937-1957
New Hampshire 74 1810-1937 9 more 1937-1957
South Dakota 22 1890-1937 0 more 1937-1957
Delaware: The annotations show 2 between 1852 and 1957.
Florida: The annotations show around 100 between 1868 and 1957.
Oklahoma: The annotations show 26 between 1890 and 1957.
Rhode Island: The annotations show 8 between 1843 and 1957.
For the Alabama picture, see Sands, footnote 9.
For the North Carolina picture, see Edsall, footnote 9.
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